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Facing a Frustrating
Fiduciary Patchwork
For an issue so fundamental to the
daily life of a trustee, the law concerning communication with trust beneficiaries ideally should be consistent
from state to state. Unfortunately, state
law is a patchwork of common law
and statutory provisions drawn (but
not consistently) from the Uniform
Probate Code, the Uniform Trust Code,
or laws that are unique to the state. The
common law is especially unsatisfying,
relying almost entirely on the various
Restatements of Trusts, because of the
dearth of reported cases. The Uniform
Trust Code, despite being enacted in 23
states, has failed to achieve uniformity
on this issue because of disagreements
in the enacting jurisdictions. For a
discussion of the numerous and inconsistent disclosure standards around
the country, see Dana G. Fitzsimons Jr.,
Navigatingthe Trustee's Duty to Disclose,
Prob. & Prop., Jan./Feb. 2009, at 40; see
also Thomas P. Gallanis, The Trustee's
Duty to Inform, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 1595
(2007).
Despite the variations in state law,
practitioners assume they can rely on
a few principles, including this one:
while the trust is revocable by the
settlor and the settlor has capacity, the
trustee's duties-including the duties to inform and account-are owed
only to the settlor. This is, after all,
the position of both the Restatement

(Third) of Trusts § 74 cmt. e and the
Uniform Trust Code § 603. The position
makes sense because the interests of
the beneficiaries are subject to the settlor's power to revoke and reclaim the
property. Several UTC states have gone
further and provided that the trustee's
duties are owed exclusively to the settlor regardless of the settlor's capacity.
But the recent decision of the
Kentucky Supreme Court in JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Longmeyer, 275
S.W.3d 697 (Ky. 2009), suggests that
this fundamental principle may not be
on as solid a footing as was assumed.
Before discussing the possible legal implications of the decision, an analysis of
the case's interesting and tragic facts is
necessary.
Oh, What a Tangled Web
We Weave
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appeared as Longmeyer Exposes (or
Creates) Uncertainty About the Duty
to Inform Remainder Beneficiaries of
a Revocable Trust, 35 ACTEC J. 129
(2009), and is adapted here with per-

Ollie Skonberg, a wealthy but frugal
widow, was a long-time customer of
Bank One (predecessor to JP Morgan
Chase Bank) and named the bank as
trustee of her revocable trust. The trust,
which was drafted by Ms. Skonberg's
attorney in 1984 and later amended
at the grand cost of $100, provided
income to Ms. Skonberg for life and
the remainder to various charities at
her death. Beyond these bare details,
the convoluted facts resemble a bar
review question and provide a sober
look at the type of case that will more
commonly occur in an aging population with a significant accumulation
of wealth and increased exposure to
dementia and other frailties.
In 1997, Ms. Skonberg was nearly
bedridden at 93 years old. Her caregiver, Vicki Smothers, arranged for
attorney John M. Longmeyer, who had
no prior contact with Ms. Skonberg, to
make changes to Ms. Skonberg's estate
plan. The new estate plan outlined by
the caregiver included the drafting of
a new revocable trust that inflated the
bequest to the caregiver from $20,000
to $500,000, appointed Longmeyer
himself as trustee with annual compensation of $100,000 in place of Bank
One, and removed the charities as
beneficiaries of the trust. The rewriting
of the estate plan was a family affair-

mission.

Longmeyer delegated the drafting

of the documents to his son-in-law
(an out-of-state lawyer), his wife and
secretary witnessed the signing, and
his physician brother-in-law spent less
than an hour with Ms. Skonberg to assess her testamentary capacity.
Bank One, after being informed of
its removal as trustee and the other
changes to the trust agreement, entered
into an agreement with Longmeyer
enabling Bank One to serve as investment agent for the trust, but the bank
at that time did not question the circumstances of the new estate planning
documents. Six weeks after the new
documents were signed, Ms. Skonberg died and Longmeyer promptly
terminated the investment agency
with the bank. The bank, on the advice
of counsel, then notified the charities
that they had been removed as trust
beneficiaries and of the other circumstances surrounding the revision of Ms.
Skonberg's estate plan. The charities
challenged the new estate plan, alleging undue influence. Ultimately, the
charities' claims were settled on the
brink of trial for $1.875 million.
Longmeyer then sued Bank One to
recoup the $1.875 million settlement
payment, alleging breach of fiduciary
duty on the bank's part on the basis
that the charities would not have
discovered their ouster as beneficiaries
(and challenged the new estate plan)
had the bank kept quiet. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor
of the bank, concluding that it had a
fiduciary duty as trustee of the original
revocable trust to inform the adversely
affected beneficiaries of its suspicions
concerning the estate plan revisions.
The case was ultimately appealed to
the Kentucky Supreme Court.

The Supremes Are
a Little Out of Tune
The Kentucky Supreme Court ruled
in favor of Bank One, holding that the
bank was protected from liability for
giving the notice, and more broadly
holding that the bank had an affirmative duty to inform the charities of their
removal. The court's rationale was
simple: the Kentucky statute (drawn
from Uniform Probate Code
§ 7-303) requiring a trustee to "keep the
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beneficiaries of the trust reasonably informed of the trust and its administration" did not provide any exception for
revocable trusts. The court was aware,
but seemingly unconcerned, that its ruling would come as a surprise to clients
and lawyers alike and observed that "if
our trust statutes are out of touch with
modem policy or with the expectations
of today's community, it is the legislature's task to amend the statutes, not
this Court's role to re-write them." 275
S.W.3d at 702.
The court could have issued a narrower opinion. For instance, it could
have held that the bank was permitted, but not obligated, to notify the
charities and therefore was immune
from liability because courts generally
will not interfere with the exercise of
discretion by a trustee acting within
the scope of its powers. Perhaps the
court was concerned with having to
reconcile the bank's delay in taking
action and having benefited from the
agency agreement with Longmeyer, or
perhaps the court preferred an absolute
rule of law that would allow it to avoid
having to deal with difficult facts, such
as the proof or lack of proof in the trial
court record concerning Ms. Skonberg's
capacity. The court could also have
decided the issue on other grounds
unrelated to the duty to disclose-for
example, that Longmeyer was not
"harmed" by making a voluntary
settlement payment or that his own
unclean hands were a bar to his claims.
Instead, the court concluded that the
right to notice was absolute.
The most troubling part of the decision is the court's refusal to distinguish
between the beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust and those of a revocable
trust while the settlor is still living and
capable of revoking the trust. The court
did not address whether a settlor in
the trust instrmnent may in the trust
agreement eliminate or reduce the duty
of the trustee to notify beneficiaries.
Nor does the opinion discuss what
sorts of information about the operation of a trust, if any, must be provided
to the beneficiaries. The easiest reading
of the opinion is that for the disclosure
obligations of the trustee, the Kentucky
Supreme Court does not distinguish
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between revocable trusts and irrevocable trusts.
A lone dissenter, Justice Schroeder,
would have created a limited carveout
for revocable trusts and remanded the
case to determine whether the trustee
was liable for disclosing confidential
trust information.
What's the Best Policy?
Despite the sweeping statements of the
court, it is possible that other courts
will choose the sensible approach of
limiting Longmeyer to its unusual facts.

Although it may be dfficult to
digest the ease by which the

court stepped around principles

of trust law and the nature of
revocable trusts, the question
must be asked--does the
Iongmeyerdecision represent
bad policy?
The majority opinion certainly contains
sufficient standout facts to facilitate
such a limitation. Although it may be
difficult to digest the ease by which
the court stepped around principles of
trust law and the nature of revocable
trusts, the question must be askeddoes the Longmeyer decision represent
bad policy? We are in the early stages
of what has been called the largest
inter-generational transfer of wealth in
the nation's history (albeit diminished
because of recent economic difficulties).
Much of that wealth is in the hands
of an aging population. As a result of
improvements in medical technology,
the lives of many will be extended,
which will also widen the exposure to
dementia and elder abuse. The Brooke
Astor elder abuse situation in New

York, although rare in the amount of
money at issue, is unfortunately becoming all too common. The current high
unemployment rate and severe market
losses will no doubt tempt others to
try to drain resources from the elderly
through abuses of powers of attorney
and positions of confidence. We are
likely to see an increasing number of
cases concerning challenges to dramatic
deathbed or post-incapacity changes
to wills and trusts. In view of these
developments, should the policy of the
law encourage or require a trustee to
alert beneficiaries-present or future,
vested or contingent, subject or not to
revocation--of suspicious circumstances concerning a change to a trust and
protect the trustee when it discloses
such information?
There are competing policy concerns. On one side is the importance
of recognizing the freedom to change
a revocable trust without unnecessary
hindrances and without having to give
notice to persons whose interests remain revocable. A revocable trust, after
all, is a will substitute. On the other side
are the risk of abuse and the argument
that, although an inconvenience or a
nuisance in the ordinary circumstance,
in the abusive situation the expanded
notice obligation can help expose bad
actors earlier before assets are improperly squandered or put beyond the
practical reach of court orders and the
court's enforcement powers.
Regardless of how one views that
policy debate, it is worthwhile to consider an alternative approach, suggested in the dissent, that might have been
taken by the bank. A trustee presented
with a doubtful or uncertain situation,
including the validity of a trust instrument purporting to remove the trustee,
could seek the aid and direction of the
court. A petition for instructions would
have required notice to the charities
as weli as Longmeyer and arguably
would have brought the issues and the
parties before the court in a way that
was less risky for the trustee. Also, it
could have avoided turnming assets over
to a potential bad actor while the court
sorted through everything. Although
the litigation would have been messy,
it would be difficult for any court to

find fault with a trustee taking such
an approach. Furthermore, by the
nature of a petition for instructions the
trustee would not have taken a position in favor of either the charities or
Longmeyer. Because Ms. Skonberg died
mere weeks after the signing of the new
trust, a petition for instructions in this
case would have been short-lived and
would have been replaced quickly with
the traditional will and trust contest
litigation. If Ms. Skonberg had lived
longer, however, a petition for instructions would have insulated her assets
for her benefit while the court sorted
through the situation.

What Do We Do Now, Ollie?
As mentioned earlier, the Longmeyer
court has encouraged the Kentucky legislature to address the issues raised in
the opinion. The Kentucky legislature
heard the call and quickly responded.
The Kentucky disclosure statute at issue
in Longmeyer, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 386.715,
has been amended to add a new
subsection (4) that provides: "While a
trust is revocable by the settlor and, in
the reasonable belief of the trustee, the
settlor has capacity to revoke the trust,
the trustee's duties under this section
extend only to the settlor."
This statutory correction should
eliminate the need for Kentucky clients
to consider potentially unattractive
options, such as creating an out-of-state
trust or opting out of Kentucky law
governing trust administration. But,
because the statutory correction turns
on the settlor's capacity (or at least the
trustee's reasonable belief of that capacity), this correction may not have actually resolved the situation in Longmeyer
in which the settlor's capacity was a
key issue. In reality, the new statute
has made the situation in Kentucky
more complex. Not only must a trustee
ascertain when a settlor has capacitym
an issue that otherwise would not arise
unless the settlor wanted to change the
trust instrument-but also must determine what constitutes a "reasonable
belief." To illustrate, must the corporate
trustee advise all beneficiaries of mom's
revocable trust when a child tells a trust
officer that "mom is very forgetful,
we are paying her bills, and she is not

doing very well"? Or what if a bank
both administers dad's revocable trust
and regularly allows an attorney-in-fact
to handle financial transactions in dad's
checking account? Does the existence
of an active attorney-in-fact require a
trustee to investigate dad's capacity?
Further legislation, or eventual litigation, will be required to resolve these
issues.
Kentucky is not a Uniform Probate
Code state generally, but the statutory
provision in Longmeyer was copied
verbatim from UPC § 7-303. The UPC
has been enacted in about 20 states. Not
all of these states enacted this particular
section of the UPC, however, and those
that did are repealing it on enactment
of the more modem and increasingly
popular Uniform Trust Code. Had Kentucky enacted the full UPC, Longmeyer
might have been decided differently.
UPC § 1-108 provides that the holder
of a general power of appointment,
including one in the form of a power of
amendment or revocation, is deemed
to act for beneficiaries whose interests
are subject to the power. This statute
has been applied to deny a remainder
beneficiary of a revocable trust access
to information concerning the trust.
Montrone v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 875
P.2d 557 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The court
in Montrone noted that the intent of the
UPC drafters was to allow the holder
of a power to revoke to negate the duty
the trustee otherwise would have to
keep the beneficiaries informed. The
issue of capacity was not before the
court in Montrone. But had the settlor
in Montrone been incapacitated, the
court's rationale suggests that because
the settlor would not have been able to
negate the duty to disclose, the trustee
would have had to keep the remainder
beneficiaries informed. One should be
hesitant, however, to draw too definitive a conclusion based on a single case.
But even if Mont rone correctly read the
UPC, a rule turning on whether the
settlor has capacity would not have
resolved the situation in Long'meyer,
in which the settlor's capacity was a
key issue. The simplistic decision of
the Kentucky Supreme Court at least
provides certainty.
The Uniform Trust Code has been

enacted in 23 states. Regarding the issues
raised in Longmeyer, resolution of those
matters under the UTC also turns on
whether the settlor has capacity. UTC
§ 603(a) provides that while a trust is
revocable and the settlor has capacity, the
duties of the trustee are owed exclusively
to the settlor. Consequently, if the settlor
has capacity, the trustee is prohibited
from giving notice to the remainder beneficiaries. But if the settlor has lost capacity, the disclosure duties under the UTC
kick in. UTC § 603(a), however, does
have one significant difference from its
UPC predecessor and also from Restatement (Third) § 74 cmt. e, which, like the
UTC, adopts the rule that while a trust is
revocable and the settlor has capacity, the
duties of the trustee are owed exclusively
to the settlor. The UTC drafters, recognizing that states were taking a diversity of
approaches on the question, placed the
language relating to the settlor's capacity in brackets, meaning that states are
free, if they wish, to amend UTC § 603(a)
to provide that the trustee's duties are
owed exclusively to the settlor regardless
of whether the settlor has capacity. About
half of the UTC states have made this
change. In those states, the bank trustee
in Longmeyer would have been prohibited from contacting the remainder
beneficiaries, although one wonders how
enforceable such a restriction would be if
the trustee has well-founded concerns of
undue influence, which appears to have
been the case.
A couple of state variations are of
interest. Missouri has enacted a middle
alternative. Although Missouri law
provides that the settlor's control over
trustee disclosure terminates on the settlor's incapacity, the statute adds a procedure for determining capacity, derived
from its guardianship and conservatorship law. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 456.6-603. If the
procedure has not been implemented,
the settlor is presumed to have capacity,
and all duties of the trustee continue to
be owed exclusively to the settlor.
Alabama is a UTC jurisdiction. The
Alabama Supreme Court recently
dismissed claims of children against a
corporate trustee for breach of fiduciary
duty with respect to the trust agreements revocable by the parents, on the
basis that under the Alabama UTC the
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trustee's duties were owed solely to the
parents as settlors. See Raines v. Synovus Trust Co., No. 1080100,2009 WL
5173510 (Ala. Dec. 30,2009).
California is not a UTC state, but its
provisions on revocable trusts were one
of the models for the UTC. California
provides that a trustee need not account
or report during any period while the
trust is revocable. Cal. Prob. Code
§ 16064. California also provides that
the settlor, and not the beneficiary, has
the rights otherwise afforded beneficiaries under the trust law. Cal. Prob. Code
§ 15800. Had a California court been
presented with the Longmeyer facts, it
would have started from the assumption that the remainder beneficiaries
were not entitled to disclosure.
Practice Suggestions for the
Estate Planning Lawyer
Practice suggestions for the instrument
drafter fall into three categories. First,
in UTC states where waiver is permitted, the settlor of a revocable trust
can in the governing instrument limit
otherwise required disclosures. Even
in states that make some notice provisions mandatory UTC § 105, which lists
the mandatory duties, applies only to
irrevocable trusts. UTC § 603, relating
to the duties of a trustee in the case of
a revocable trust, is subject to override
by the settlor. This override approach
may not be available in UPC and common law states. The extent to which
an otherwise required notice can be
waived under UPC § 7-303, the provision at issue in Longmeyer, has never
been pinned down. For common law
states, under the Restatement (Second)
of Trusts, and, using slightly different
language, the more recent Restatement
(Third) of Trusts, the settlor's right to
waive is limited. A settlor may not limt
the beneficiary's right to information
reasonably necessary to enable the
beneficiary to enforce the beneficiary's
rights to prevent or redress a breach of
trust. Restatement (Second) of Trusts
§ 173 cmt. c; Restatement (Third) of
Trusts § 74 cmt. e.
Second, if the client resides in a state
with undesirable law, the instruent
could include a choice of law provision
adopting "better" law in line with the
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client's wishes. Such a provision is most
likely to be effective if the trustee is located in the state with the desirable law
so that the choice of law clause has a
relationship to the trust and the validity
of the provision would likely have to be
litigated in that state.
Finally, the settlor can attempt to
limit the class of beneficiaries entitled
to notice. For example, the settlor might
provide in a revocable trust for the
distribution of the assets at the settlor's
death to the settlor's probate estate,
unless the settlor exercised a general
power of appointment. In this instance,

The evolution of the law
concerning the trustee's duty

to disclose informlon to the
trust beneliciaries creates new

risks for trustees who are
unaware of their obligations.
there may not be any beneficiary with
a sufficient interest in the trust to be
entitled to notice. In considering such
an approach, care must be taken so that
there is a sufficient separation of legal
and equitable title.

Practice Suggestions for
Fiduciaries
Surcharge litigation is increasing, making it important that trustees identify
and manage all aspects of their fiduciary risk-including risk that either
arises directly or is affected by the
trustee's disclosure obligations. Longmeyer complicates that task. Fiduciary
risk should be evaluated before accepting the appointment and regularly

throughout the administration. As part
of that evaluation, the trustee should
understand its duty to disclose information to the beneficiaries.
Trusts that restrict disclosure can
expose the trustees to increased risk
of a surcharge action-by preventing
potentially ameliorative pre-litigation
communication with beneficiaries,
denying full access to defenses based on
good faith, and preventing the running
of statutes of limitation on surcharge
actions. A trust agreement that restricts
a trustee's ability to disclose information
also can prevent the trustee from taking
advantage of risk management tools
under the UTC (where enacted), which
include entering into binding nonjudicial settlement agreements with trust
beneficiaries (UTC § 111), a short statute
of limitations on trust contests and
surcharge actions (UTC § 1005), limiting
objections to terminating distributions
(UTC § 817), and obtaining beneficiary
consents, releases, and ratifications
(UTC § 1009). Because of this increased
exposure, trustees should consider
whether it is appropriate to serve as
trustee under an agreement that restricts
disclosure.
Conclusion
The evolution of the law concerning
the trustee's duty to disclose information to the trust beneficiaries, through
cases like Longmeyer, creates new risks
for trustees who are unaware of their
obligations. Trustees will also face an
increasing number of difficult situations
as in Longmeyer as a result of an aging
and increasingly infirm population.
Although it can be a difficult decision to
make under pressure, a trustee should
give strong consideration to policies that
favor prompt and complete disclosure
even in difficult circumstances. Also,
trustees should remember that the
courts are available for their protection
when confronted with genuine doubt
and difficulty in the administration of
the trust. When a trust is dramatically
amended under questionable circumstances, it is hard to imagine any court
finding fault in a trustee who seeks
clarification and confirmation from the
court through a petition for instructions
or similar action. U

